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Projections as Concepts

Paul R. Cohen
Department of Computer Science
Lederle Graduate Research Center
University of Massachusetts, Amherst MA 01003
cohen@cs.umass.edu

Abstract

What do the rst concepts look like? I propose that the earliest concepts learned by infants
are abstractions of activities. The semantics of these concepts are predictive|a good abstraction is one that will help the infant predict reward. This idea has been implemented in several
programs, in particular, as uents in the Baby simulator and preimages in Coelho and Grupen's robotics work. Additional examples and a longer version of this paper can be found at
http://eksl-www.cs.umass.edu /research/conceptual-systems/index.html

Keywords: Conceptual development
One of the great mysteries of human development is how a sensorimotor neonate becomes a
thinking child. Piaget documented the stages of infancy that lead to conceptual knowledge and he
sketched mechanisms|assimilation and accommodation|that drive development [13]. Today his
account is challenged partly because assimilation and accommodation are mechanisms only in a very
weak and general sense, a bit like saying, \to win football games you should move the ball down eld."
Today scientists have a higher standard: It should be possible to implement the process by which a
sensorimotor agent becomes a conceptual agent in a robot, and test the predictions of this model in
human infants. This is what my colleagues and I are trying to do. It should be possible to explain
the emergence of particular categories and concepts, and not others, from sensorimotor interaction
with the environment. Ultimately we seek conceptual underpinnings for higher cognitive functions
such as planning and language.
What is the primitive stu out of which concepts develop? Nativists give one kind of answer,
empiricists another (the full paper reviews several approaches to the question, particularly those of
Piaget [13], E. Gibson [7], Spelke [15], Carey [2], Baillargeon [1], J. Mandler [11.12], M. Johnson [8],
Drescher [6], and Lako [9,10]). Here, I give a simple account of conceptual primitives as projections
of experience.
An ideal candidate for a conceptual primitive would be something that is just a small step away
from sensorimotor experience, yet is an abstraction of experience (concepts are abstractions). If
we regard experiences as trajectories through a space S of very high dimension, then experiences
may be similar or di erent in many ways, each corresponding to a projection of S. The process of
abstraction that produces concepts is identical with nding a projection of S; they are di erent ways
of talking about the same thing. The criterion for a good abstraction (projection) is predictiveness,
thus concepts have a well-de ned semantics: the meaning of a concept is what it entails or predicts
about what may be experienced, next. One sees immediately the relationship between concepts
and attention: If experience is a trajectory through a high dimensional space, and if concepts are
projections of the space, then a concept selects aspects of experience (called the scope of the concept)
and thus \conceptual thought" involves attending to those aspects of S within the scope of a concept.
Our challenge has been to build programs that acquire concepts|that is, abstractions of experience with predictive semantics|by interacting with the world, and we are trying hard to be stingy
with the innate endowment. I'll illustrate our work by describing two projects, from my lab and
from the Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics at the University of Massachusetts. The full paper will
elaborate on these examples.
The Babyworld simulator contains a highly stylized \baby" with eyes, ears, a mouth, one arm and
no legs [4,5]. Baby's experience is implemented in 26 streams which code what it's seeing, hearing,
and mouthing, as well as internal states such as hunger, pain and alertness. Some streams code
for initiating action (e.g., DO-ARM) and others code for the action itself (ARM move...). Baby's

behavior is simple and probabilistic; for instance, it gets hungry sometime after it eats, determined
by a probability distribution. Babyworld is unrealistic in many respects. Notably, we have nessed
all perceptual issues by placing \percepts" directly in Baby's streams; for example, when Baby's
eyes are pointing at the green rattle, the token \green" is placed in the sight-color stream and the
token \rattle-shaped" is placed in the sight-shape stream. Shortly I'll describe a project that doesn't
nesse perception.
Baby learns concepts of the sort I've been talking about|predictive abstractions of experience,
or if you prefer, predictive projections of its 26-dimensional space of experience. Baby's learning
involves counting co-occurrences of events relative to the frequencies with which the events do not
co-occur. These frequencies are sucient to establish whether events are statistically dependent,
that is, whether the occurrence of one predicts the occurrence of another. When a dependency
between events is suciently strong, Baby creats an object that represents the joint event. The
details aren't important. What's important is that this business of counting cooccurrences yields
two kinds of predictiveness. First, if the events are lagged in time, then one event predicts the other.
Second, if the events are simultaneous, then Baby has learned a two-dimensional projection of its
26-dimensional space in which events happen.
In fact, Baby counts several kinds of events. The simplest is a change in the value of a stream;
for example, when Baby's eyes shift from the green rattle to the red keys, the SIGHT-COLOR and
SIGHT-SHAPE streams both change value simultaneously. Over time, Baby learns scopes, which
are pairs of streams in which tokens tend to change simultaneously. Scopes are extraordinarily
primitive concepts in the sense of being predictive abstractions of experience. The abstraction is
just, \here are two streams in which, in my experience, things tend to change simultaneously,"
and it is predictive in the weak sense that if one stream changes, the other probably does, too.
A stronger notion of predictiveness comes when Baby starts to use scopes to focus its attention
in learning. Once a scope has been learned, Baby uses it as a template for simple uents, which
are constructed from token values that start and stop within a scope. For example, within the
(SIGHT-SHAPE, SIGHT-COLOR) scope, Baby might relatively frequently see the simultaneous
occurrence of (SIGHT-SHAPE RATTLE-SHAPE) and (SIGHT-COLOR GREEN), in which case
it would create a conjunctive uent. An even stronger notion of predictiveness comes from having
Baby count cooccurrences not of token values but of uents. In particular, Baby learns that some
uents tend to start after others start. These produce what we call context uents.
Here is a context uent that Baby learned. It says, \in the context of having no tactile sensation
in the mouth and crying, grasp something with a wooden texture":
(CONTEXT
((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))

And here is another context uent that says, in the context of grasping something with wooden
texture, the experience of feeling something wooden in the mouth and mouthing it, begins:
(CONTEXT
((tactile-hand wood)(hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))

As the rst component of this uent is identical to the second component of the previous one, Baby
may form a chain uent:
(CHAIN

((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))

Here is another chain uent learned by Baby:
(CHAIN
((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand plastic) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic)(do-mouth mouth)))

The structure of these uents is almost identical. Each describes an episode in which Baby is
holding nothing and crying, then holding an object (either wood or plastic), then mouthing the
object. Although Baby cannot yet form equivalence classes of objects, I think these chain uents
provide the evidence for a class of objects, some wooden, some plastic, that play a particular role
in the activity represented by the chains. In other words, I think Baby is poised ready to learn to
categorize objects based on their roles.
Returning to my original claim, the concept to be learned is a projection of Baby's experience
(which encompasses a 26-dimensional space) onto ve dimensions: TACTILE-HAND, TACTILEMOUTH, HAND, VOICE, DO-MOUTH. The chain provide expectations of tokens in these ve
dimensions; indeed, chains aren't learned unless they do a good job predictively. Thus the chain is
a concept, as I described it earlier|a predictive projection|and it is an abstraction in the sense
that the other 21 dimensions are ignored. But when we compare multiple chains, another kind of
predictive projection can be found. The TACTILE-HAND and TACTILE-MOUTH dimensions can
contain something that is either wooden or plastic. This disjunction is also an abstraction, and it
corresponds to the two kinds of rattles that Baby has in its environment.
The second project I want to mention was done by Je erson Coelho and Rod Grupen at the
Laboratory for Perceptual Robotics [3]. They showed how a projection of the state information
encountered while grasping an object could be used to identify the object. Very roughly speaking, a
Salisbury hand attempts to grasp a prismatic object by activating controllers that run to convergence,
that is, the controllers attempt to minimize force residuals and wrench residuals. The net e ect of
running these controllers is that the ngers of the hand migrate over the surface of the object until
they achieve a stable grasp. It turns out that these migrations describe trajectories in the twodimensional error space. The union of all trajectories for a given object is called a preimage, and
the shape of the preimage depends on the object geometry. In consequence, one can imagine that
as the hand attempts to grasp the object, it is \considering" all object preimages simultaneously. It
rules some out when the hand enters a con guration that is inconsistent with that object.
Remarkably, Coelho and Grupen's robot can identify objects by \feel" as it attempts to gain a
stable grasp around them. This is a very clear example of a conceptual activity|classifying objects|
that arises out of a purely sensorimotor activity. Preimages work the trick, and preimages are just
predictive projections of experience. Of all the features of the robot's experience that might have
been measured, Coelho and Grupen chose to measure force error and wrench error, and the resulting
projections were sucient to discriminate objects. By the way, preimages are bona de predictive
projections: The robot uses the predictions to adjust its grasp.
Concepts for Baby and the grasping robot are grounded in activities. For example, two chains
represent identical activities, hence the di erent participants in those activities (wooden and plastic
rattles) form an equivalence class with respect to the activities. Following Lako , Johnson, Mandler
and others I suggest that classi cation grounded in activity is the only way to go. The objectivist
position|that the world \has" categories, and it is the infant's job to learn them|must be wrong.
For one thing, categories change as the infant develops, as do the criteria for categorization. Initially,

children categorize thematically (i.e., in an activity-oriented way), only later do they attend to socalled objective properties such as shape and color.
Objective properties have gotten a bad name because they appear inadequate to explain the
psychology of categories [14,9]. Lako and others suggest that categorization might instead be based
on interactional properties [9,8]. For example, one such category for Baby is, \something I can grasp
and mouth, either wooden or plastic," based on interactional properties \graspable," \mouthable,"
and \texture." One is tempted by the conjecture that although categories cannot be de ned in
terms of necessary and sucient objective features, they might be de ned in terms of necessary and
sucient interactional features. However, I believe categories are best de ned in terms of activities,
and the apparent superiority of interactional features is due to them describing activities better than
objective features.
Consider a conceptual activity such as judging whether a cup and a ladle are similar or di erent.
We immediately want to ask, \Similar or di erent in what context?" As devices for transferring
liquid, cups and ladles are similar; as containers to drink from, they require di erent motor schemas;
as something to serve co ee in at an elegant dinner, they aren't similar. Note that the required
context in which we judge similarity is often an activity, often purposeful, and often agent-centered.
We are tempted to say the interactional properties of cups and ladles are a better basis for judgments
of similarity than their objective properties. However, objective properties might be relevant to
judgments of similarity; for instance, the material of which ladles and cups are made is relevant in
the context of dropping them on the oor or taking them backpacking. Evidently, what's central to
judging the similarity of objects is knowing which activities the objects are involved in. Activities
seem to select which features of objects are relevant to judgments of similarity; these features will
sometimes be objective, often interactional.
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